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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case actually involves the rights of the parties on 
a lien foreclosure, based upon a labor and material mans 
lien on a sub-contract agreement for the dry-wall work on 
an apartment house in Cedar City, Utah. At an earlier hear-
ing, the court had ordered the lien discharged upon the pay-
ment into court of a specific sum determined by the court. 
While the lien had actually been released by court order, 
the matter still arises under Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Judge, award-
ed judgement against the defendant Remco, Incorporated, 
only, for the sum of $5,990.14, being $4,064.94, on the con-
tract, interest in the amount of $325.20, together with 
$1,600.00 attorney fees, and ordered a satisfaction of judg-
ment, when said sums were paid out of the sums posted with 
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the clerk, and in addition awarded judgment of no cause of 
action, on the cross-claim and counter-claim of Remco, In-
corporated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties entered into a sub-contract agreement 
which is Plaintiff's exhibit 2, entered in evidence, as is often 
the case, each party blames the other for the matter not 
working, however it is undenied that paragraph 5 of the 
contract, required almost immediate payment of the mater-
ials, and about the only basis Wagstaff could enter into the 
contract was, being able to buy his materials in bulk. Doing 
this should have been advantageous for both parties. It was 
admitted that when Mr. Wagstaff moved off the job, these 
materials Wiere not paid for and that the contract was never 
current at any time thereafter. The appellant failed to pro-
vide the Supreme Court with a complete transcript and the 
Respondent has provided the Supreme Court with a report-
ers transcript of the opening statements of counsel and 
items of this nature. In this short transcript this may be 
found beginning at page 12, line 14, and continuing to page 
12, line 23. The only point that should have been tried after 
these admissions, was the amount of damages of Wagstaff. 
Wagstaff did not at any time refuse to go back onto the 
job, he took the position at all times that he was obligated 
to complete the job, that he was ready and willing to do 
same as soon as the payments were available so that he 
could pay the people that he was obligated to. There is no 
question that at all times, from the time Wagstaff put mat-
erials on the job, and Remco failed to pay for same in ac-
cordance with the contract, up to the time of the trial, there 
was money due and owing to Wagstaff, and that at any and 
all times during that period, he was entitled to a lien under 
the provisions of Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, and that he did file such a lien. There is some ar-
gument over the amount of the lien, however, at the time of 
the lien, said lien was not filed in sufficient size, and the 
payments made thereafter, more than totaled the lien. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE DE-
PENDANT HAD BREACHED THE CONTRACT. 
In the first place Wagstaff is entitled to have the trial 
court action viewed in the light most favorable to him in 
view of the decision that has been rendered and this has 
been upheld by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in 
the case of Buehner Block Co. vs. Glezo's, 6 Utah 2nd, 226, 
310 Pacific 2nd, 517, also the case of Beck vs. Jeppsson, 1 
Utah 2nd, 127, 262 Pacific 2nd, 760. 
There is no argument that Remco failed to pay in ac-
cordance with the terms of the contract, in paragraph 5 
thereof, also from the nature of the case, it was quite ap-
parent that Remco was in trouble financially in as much as 
the plaintiff John P. Jordon filed a lien and started a fore-
closure on same, and his ammended complaint included be-
sides Remco, Incorporated, and Robert Richins, eighteen 
other defendants, seventeen of which had filed liens. The 
big end of these liens were actually discharged by agree-
ment, by the payment of the lien costs plus twenty five per-
cent, (25%). At anytime there is money due and owing on a 
sub-contract for the construction of a building, under the 
terms of the contract, there is a breach of contract. 
While Remco took the attitude that they had reserva-
tions about paying, there was actually only one item that 
came up that in anyway was proper to pay, and that would 
not have come up had Remco complied with the contract and 
made the payments. The liens complained of pertaining to 
Cranmer and Christensen, would never have been filed, had 
the payments been made. The Internal Revenue Service 
levied on Remco, for a transaction from outside the con-
tract, which was paid by Remco after the lien was filed al-
though they indicated four months before payment, they 
had payed same. This is the only item from outside the job 
that ever entered into the picture. In all probability had 
Remco paid promptly, this would not have entered into the 
picture. 
3 
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POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF REMCO'S 
CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO CANCEL LIEN WAS PROPER. 
This counterclaim and cross-complaint was brought 
under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 38-1-24, pro-
viding for $20.00 a day payment for a failure to cancel lien 
after notice. There is no question as to the statute involved 
in this particular transaction, however the only way 
that this could be brought into effect, would be if the 
ir-oney was tendered, in conformity with the lien. This was 
not done. The money was never tendered, and there is no 
proof in the transcript whatsoever of any tender of any item. 
There is only an offer of payment upon release of the lien, 
and the offer was couched in a sum satisfactory to Remco, 
and not satisfactory to Triangle. There was never an actual 
tender, and even with a proper amount, the statute would 
not be applicable until there is a tender, or payment. As long 
as there is a bonafide argument over the amount due, even 
tender of a lesser amount, would not place the matter under 
this penalty. This position is upheld in Brimwood Homes, 
Inc., vs. Knudsen Builders Supply Co., 14 Utah 2nd 419, 385 
Pacific 2nd, 982. This was a situation where lien rights were 
not waived and the court held that they could be collected 
together with attorney fees and failure to release futures, 
was not actionable. 
This lien was not placed for an exaggerated amount, 
contrary to the allegations of Remco. At the time of placing 
the lien, it was actually placed for an amount less than 
what was coming. When one deducts from it the Internal 
Revenue Levie, which had not been paid at the time the 
lien was placed, together with the other items of employees 
of Triangle, which were later paid direct, amounts in excess 
of that which Triangle felt proper, and the lien should have 
been greater than it actually was. There was no time from 
the filing of the lien until the payment after trial, that mon-
ey was not owed to Triangle. 
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POINT m 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN HOLDING 
THAT TRIANGLE NEITHER HAD TO FINISH THE DRY 
WALL WORK OR PAY THE AMOUNT TO HAVE THE 
WORK FINISHED, OR PAY FOR MATERIALS REQUIRED 
TO COMPLETE THE JOB. 
There is no question that Triangle had sufficient mater-
ials on the job to complete same, these materials were taken 
over by Remco. There is also no question that Remco was 
told by Triangle, that at anytime the matter was paid, that 
they would be quite happy to come along and complete the 
job. They were never advised that Remco was hiring other 
people and having other people do the work. There is no 
question that almost all contractors follow a habit of when 
they think they are going to be able to charge it against the 
sub-contractor, of paying out without hesitation anything 
that they happen to think of. The trial court held that only 
the proper costs of completing the job to Triangle, should 
be deducted from what they had coming. The amounts that 
Triangle admitted were proper and would have cost Tri-
angle, had they completed the job, were deducted. The re-
ference in the Appellants Brief, in Young vs. Hansen, 117 
Utah 591, 218 Pacific 2nd, 666, is not in point, in as much as 
this is a contract on sale of property, and nothing to do with 
a building contract. The same is true on the case of Perkins 
vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 Pacific 2nd, 446, same is not 
in point in as much as it is a purchase contract on real es-
tate, and is not a building contract and conditions are dif-
ferent. Also those items in the other liens that Triangle felt 
were proper items, when applied to its contract, were al-
lowed as offsets in the amount determined by the court. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FEEDING THAT 
THERE WAS NO ESTOPPEL ON THE CONTRACT WHEN 
TRIANGLE CONTINUED WITH ITS PERFORMANCE 
AFTER THE BREACH OF THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
OF PARAGRAPH 5, PROVIDING FOR PAYMENT OF MAT-
ERIALS. 
There is no question that any bonafide contractor tends 
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to work things out, and had money been coming shortly, that 
Wagstaff or Triangle, as he was doing business, would not 
have stood on a breach. There is no question that he put his 
own money into the transaction for a considerable period of 
time to the point that he was in trouble with Internal Rev-
enue on other items, that he performed as long as he could 
on his own finances. However, there was continuing failure 
to make other payments and continuing breaches. 
The Appellant cites Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Association, vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 7 
Utah 2nd 366, 325 Pacific 2nd 899, as authority, that a breach 
of an insubstantial nature, which is severable and does not 
vitally change the transaction, and does not release the 
other party completely from performing his obligations un-
der contract, but gives rise to right for damages for any loss 
occasioned thereby should be authority for the Appellants 
position. This Prudential item, was enforcement of a new 
contract which was entered into in writing after the breach, 
and is completely out of point. The new contract covered 
the matter. Also when one starts talking about insubstan-
tial breaches, the failure to pay a material payment of 
$14,580.00, on a $49,000.00, contract is not insubstantial. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN AWARDING AT-
TORNEY'S FEES. 
There is no question of an amount due and owing under 
the contract, although money had been posted, this was 
still a lien action, and although the lien had previously 
been released by court order, upon the posting, the Shupe 
case upholds the courts action. Percentages set forth by 
Appellant in his brief, in point 5, do not take into considera-
tion the other amounts paid after the filing of the lien. 
Without any question the Shupe case upholds the posi-
tion of the court, pertaining to attorney fees, and as long as 
this action is under a lien, even though the money had been 
posted, the provisions of Title 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, 
apply. In addition to the Shupe case, which is found at 18 
Utah 2nd, 134, 15 Pacific 2nd, 246, the case of Brimwood 
Homes vs. Knudsen Builders Supply Company, applies, this 
is found as 14 Utah 2nd, 419, 385 Pacific 2nd 982. Actually 
6 
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this Rrimwood case1 in most instances is very similar to 
the case' at bar and decides most of the points set forth 
therein, with the exception that in the instant case we do 
not have the question of any release. 
The first part of the first paragraph in the conclusion in 
the Appellants Brief, is an admission that the trial court was 
correct in all of its fln^^rs, 
CONCLUSION 
There was no failure to perform on the part of Triangle, 
and the Appellant has admitted that they did not make the 
payments as indicated and has admitted that they did not 
ask or advise' Triangle that they were going to complete the 
job. 
Under these conditions, the aetn-i < i 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
p A T R I C K H# FENTON 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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